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The Political Economy 
of International Labor 
Migration Law 
Trade specialists look at the field 
of migration and often ask, “Why are 
there so few international commitments 
to liberalize movement of workers, 
compared to the extensive commitments 
that exist to liberalize trade in goods?” 
Goods are usually single purchase events 
and do not broadly entail a continuing 
relationship between buyer and seller. 
Even services, while entailing more 
complex and durable relationships 
than a purchase of goods, are relatively 
unidimensional. Individuals, on the other 
hand, are multidimensional, and their 
movement as workers involves long-
term relationships of great complexity 
with governments and with employers. 
Migration specialists often refer to the 
aphorism attributed to the Swiss author 
Max Frisch: “We imported workers 
and got people instead” (Borjas 2007). 
People come with cultures and skills, 
and they grow up in dense familial and 
social networks. They have spouses 
and children. They need education, 
health care, political engagement, and 
all of the other fruits of society. They 
bear responsibilities to society as well, 
including taxes and perhaps military 
service. So, as we discuss migration, we 
must recognize that it requires breaking 
and restructuring many relationships: 
a costly endeavor in the deepest sense. 
Yet despite these costs, large numbers of 
people today seem eager to move. 
However, there are substantial 
barriers in place to prevent these people 
from achieving their desires to move 
in order to seek a better life. These 
barriers demean human welfare. So it 
seems worthwhile to grapple with the 
complexity in order to evaluate whether 
and how to unlock substantial welfare 
gains. Individuals will only decide to 
undertake migration if they perceive that 
it is worthwhile to them. Throughout 
history, some have decided to do so, 
while many others have not. But we must 
also recognize that there are costs and 
benefits that are external to the individual 
migrant. The migrant may be permitted 
to decide whether to accept these costs 
and benefits for his or her own family, 
but what about costs and benefits of the 
migrant’s decision that are felt by the 
migrant’s former compatriots, or by the 
migrant’s new hosts? 
The role of international law, in 
this as in other contexts, is to allow 
states to constrain themselves where 
their unregulated action would be less 
desirable than action constrained by 
international law. International law has 
not broadly responded to state restraints 
on immigration. There are a number of 
reasons why there is little international 
law addressing such state restraints. One 
reason is that these restraints are fairly 
recent. 
The United States, which was once 
a nation of immigrants, only began to 
restrict immigration in 1875, and then 
restrictions were limited to those who 
were destitute, engaged in immoral 
activities, or physically handicapped 
(Neuman 1993, p. 1883). This restriction 
seems to be intended to protect the 
public fisc, as opposed to jobs. The 
U.S. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 
responded to concerns about competition 
from cheap immigrant labor, as well as 
racism. In fact, throughout the history 
of immigration restrictions we see the 
influence of both protectionism and 
racism. However, the late nineteenth 
century was still a period of effectively 
liberal policies toward migration. 
Roughly 60 million Europeans emigrated 
to the New World between 1820 and 
1914. This liberalism ended in the 
imposition of country-of-origin quotas 
during the early twentieth century 
(O’Rourke 2004). 
During the early twentieth century, 
many popular destination states began 
to establish restrictions on immigration. 
During the past 60 years, global society 
has made important strides toward free 
movement of goods, money, and even 
some types of services. Yet human 
migration for economic and noneconomic 
reasons remains broadly constrained. 
The book The International Law of 
Economic Migration: Toward the Fourth 
Freedom, recently published by the 
Upjohn Institute (see p. 7), explores the 
law and policy of international economic 
migration. It analyzes the economics 
and politics of migration in order to 
assess the fit between the legal rules 
and institutions that presently exist to 
govern international economic migration, 
and the goal of maximizing welfare. In 
fact, there are practically no multilateral 
international legal rules regulating 
migration for economic purposes. This 
work shows that, in order to establish 
the domestic and international political 
conditions for welfare-enhancing 
liberalization of migration, it may 
be necessary to establish binding 
international legal agreements regarding 
liberalization.
The gains from total trade 
liberalization, according to a recent 
World Bank study, are estimated at 
$155 billion annually, while the gains 
from a 3 percent increase in the stock 
of migrants is $175 billion (World Bank 
2006, p. 41). Not only does migration 
reform provide greater aggregate gains, 
but the gains are distributed more greatly 
to developing countries. No wonder 
thoughtful observers ask why economic 
migration is not on the global agenda. 
The gains from total trade 
liberalization are estimated
 at $155 billion annually, while 
the gains from a 3 percent 
increase in the stock of 
migrants is $175 billion.
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It seems reasonable to conclude that 
liberalization of migration presents the 
possibility of substantial improvement 
of global welfare, even though these are 
only estimates, with many assumptions 
and empirical gaps. However, the devil 
is in the details of the distribution of 
increased (and decreased) welfare, and 
in the political consequences of these 
distributional details. 
So, why do we see very little 
diplomatic activity toward international 
legal commitments for liberalization of 
economic migration? Why do we see 
few initiatives by states to unilaterally 
liberalize immigration, which would 
often have beneficial economic effects? 
Is the political economy story of 
international migration like the story of 
international trade, in which international 
legal commitments are useful to provide 
reciprocal incentives for exporters 
to lobby, alongside consumers, for 
lower import duties? We see a few 
regional or preferential agreements for 
liberalization—most notably, and most 
successfully, those within the EU and 
between Australia and New Zealand. We 
see almost no such agreements between 
wealthy countries and poor countries. 
Why? 
Less-skilled workers from developed 
countries will rarely wish to migrate: they 
are likely to reduce their income if they 
go to a poor country, and they cannot 
improve their income much by moving to 
a developed country. On the other hand, 
it is difficult to adapt to a new culture, 
language, and lifestyle. 
Skilled workers from developed 
countries may wish to migrate to other 
developed countries, and often this is 
permitted, although economic downturns 
seem to reduce the interest in immigrants. 
Skilled workers from developed countries 
have not sought work in developing 
countries in large numbers, presumably 
because they can earn a greater income 
in developed countries, which have more 
complementary factors to make them 
more productive. 
Skilled workers from developing 
countries often wish to migrate to 
developed countries for the same reason: 
complementary factors in wealthy 
countries would allow them to increase 
their productivity and therefore increase 
their incomes. Policies in developed 
countries vary, but until the recent 
economic crisis there were important 
initiatives to facilitate immigration of 
skilled workers. Skilled workers would 
generally be expected to increase the 
welfare of the destination state. 
Basic economic theory would 
suggest that migration of less-skilled 
workers from where they are abundant—
developing countries—to where they are 
relatively scarce—developed countries—
would increase general welfare. However, 
there are two major concerns. First, 
there is continuing debate regarding the 
extent to which less-skilled workers in 
the destination state experience reduced 
wages because of immigration of 
competing workers. Second, there is still 
some debate regarding the extent to which 
developing home states may experience 
reduced welfare due to “brain drain.” 
Remittances and return migration may 
reduce the negative effects of brain drain. 
If a multilateral framework 
agreement existed within which states 
could negotiate specific liberalization 
commitments regarding immigration, 
perhaps including reciprocal exchanges 
for liberalization in other areas such as 
investment or trade in goods or services, 
it is likely that states would more easily 
reach specific agreements that enhance 
welfare. It is also possible that enough 
enhanced welfare could be generated to 
compensate any less-skilled workers in 
the destination state who are adversely 
affected, or to compensate the home state 
for any adverse effects of brain drain. 
There are many questions that 
would be relevant to the structure of an 
international agreement providing for 
liberalization of economic migration. 
Would this agreement provide for 
nondiscrimination among home 
countries, or would it be possible for 
states to make special bilateral or 
plurilateral commitments? Should 
permission to immigrate be temporary 
or permanent? How would immigrants 
be treated in terms of local taxes, social 
security, health care, access for family 
members, and inclusion in the political 
community? These collateral issues could 
operate as inducements or deterrents to 
migration. Under what circumstances, 
such as a recession, may the destination 
state reduce its commitments? Would 
an organization be needed? Could the 
International Organization on Migration, 
the World Trade Organization, the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development, the International Labor 
Organization, or a new organization, best 
perform the requisite functions? 
It would be worthwhile for states to 
examine these issues, as their resolution 
could allow states to unlock great 
amounts of increased welfare, to increase 
the liberty of individuals to move, and 
to reduce global income inequality. The 
International Law of Economic Migration 
can inform this examination. 
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There is debate regarding 
the extent to which less-skilled 
workers in the destination 
state experience reduced wages 
because of immigration of 
competing workers.
